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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. J. DAlT~I CONSTRUCTION 
C·O}\fp .. A .. :KY, a. corporation, 
Plain tiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
THO~IAS B. CHILD . and C. \)T. 
CHILD·, co-partners doing business 
under the name and style of Thomas 
B. Child and Company, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 7790 
The appellant's statement of facts does not cover the 
facts. In many instances matters which are stated to 
be faets were counsel's view of what he would like the 
facts to be and not what the evidence showed. We have 
accordingly deemed it advisable to make our own state-
ment of the facts and to incorporate as nearly as possible 
the evidence given by the parties rather than our own 
conclusions as to what that evidence might be. 
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This is an appeal froin a judgment dismissing the 
action, ( R. 60, 97). The motion to dismiss was made at 
a pre-trial hearing at which both plaintiff and defendants 
were represented by their counsel, (R. 52, 53). Attorneys 
for plaintiff at the sa1ne hearing moved for judgment 
in plaintiff's favor with the case to be submitted to the 
jury for determination of damages only, (R. 52). On 
October 26, 1951, the court granted the defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss the action and denied the plaintiff's mo-
tion, and the case was ordered dismissed, (R. 59). The at-
torneys for the plaintiff on December 5, 19151, submitted 
to the trial judge a formal order dismissing the case 
which was signed and filed on that date, (R. 60). The at-
torneys for plaintiff did not request the trial court at that 
time to make any findings of fact and did not submit any 
wri,tten findings to the court and thereafter on December 
21 filed a notice appealing from the order of December 
5, 1951, granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the 
action and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, (R. 97). 
This appeal is accordingly from the order of dismissal 
which was prepared and submitted to the tria~ court by 
the plaintiff. 
THE PLEADINGS 
According to the complaint, (R. 1-2), the plaintiff 
was a California corporation qualified to do business 
in Utah, and as general contractor had submitted a 
bid, and on June 29, 1950, was awarded a contract to con-
struct certain firewalls in buildings at the Utah General 
Depo1t, Ogden, Utah. It was further alleged in the com-
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plaint that plaintiff's bid on the project was in part based 
upon a bid dated June 23, 1950, submitted by the defend-
ants as a proposed subcontractor in which the defend-
ants proposed to furnish all labor and materials neces-
sary for the completion of the brick work on the firewalls 
for a consideration of $91,392.00; that the plaintiff 
accepted the bid made by the defendants and in conform-
ity therewith submitted a contract dated July 11, 1950, 
to be executed by the defendants, but that the defendants 
refused to execute the same; that the plaintiff vvas there-
by obliged to do the brick work covered by the defend-
ants' bid at a cost to it of $79,500.00 over the amount 
of defendants' bid. 
By their answer, (R. 3-5), the defendants admitted 
that the plaintiff, as general contractor, was awarded the 
contract; admitted that the defendants had submitted 
to the plain tiff a proposal dated June 23, 1950, to furnish 
all labor and materials necessary for the completion of 
the brick work on the firewalls, but denied that the plain-
tiff had accepted the defendants' proposal and alleged 
that under date of July 11, 1950, the plaintiff mailed the 
defendants a contract for their signature 'vhich contract 
was not in conformity with defendants' proposal and wa.s 
not an acceptance thereof and was never signed by the 
defendants. The defendants further alleged that the con-
tract tendered by the plaintiff varied in material p-rovi-
sions from the defendants' proposal. The answer denied 
that the plaintiff sustained any damage by reason of any 
action or conduct on the part of the defendants. 
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THE PROCEEDINGS 
R. C. Riding, who testified that he was plaintiff's 
superintendent of construction, (R. 14), and Thomas B. 
Child, one of the defendant partners, were the only per-
sons representing either of the parties between whom 
any conversations were had relative to the issues in the 
case. All of the preliminary negotiations in connection 
with the submitting of the bid were· handled on behalf of 
plaintiff by Riding exclusively, (Deposition 5, R. 32, 50). 
The defendants took the pre-trial deposition of Riding, 
and the plaintiff took the pre-trial deposition of Child, 
in which all conversations and dealings betwe-en them 
were covered. These depositions are a part of this record 
and consist of 118 pages beginning at R. 102. 
On S·eptember 29, 1951, the attorneys for the re-
spective parties entered into a written stipulation, (R. 
14-29), the purpose of which as stated in the opening 
paragraph the-reof, was "to enable the court to determine 
'vhether the plaintiff as a matter of law accepted or re-
jected the , defendants' bid p-roposal." This stipulation 
further provided that the de-positions of R. C. Riding 
and Thomas B. Child might be opened and published 
and were made a part of the stipulation in order to fully 
show the testimony offered by each of said parties with 
such exceptions as we-re noted in the stipulation, (R. 14). 
On October 16, 19·51, the- case came on for pre-trial 
hearing before Judge Ellett, (R. 30-55), at which time 
the- Specifications covering the firewalls were received 
in evidence and marked Exhibit "A"; also Addendum 
No. 1 which was dated June 12, 1950, was received in 
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evidence and Inarked Exhibit ~'B," (R. 36). The proposed 
subcontract \Yhich "yas 1nailed out to the defendants by 
the plaintiff \Yas received a8 Exhibit '·C," and the Plans 
in connection \Yi th the proposed firevvalls were received 
as Exhibits ~~n" and ~~E," (R. 38). A Subcontract Agree-
ment dated July 31, 1950, bet\veen Clark Ivory and the 
plaintiff for the brick \York on said project vvas received 
and marked Exhibit ~•F'." ..c\.t the pre-trial the defend-
ants' counsel conceded that the court might use the infor-
mation in the stipulation or in the depositions as well as 
the exhibits for the purpose of detern1ining as a matter 
of law whether or not there was a contract. However, 
in the event that the court ruled that there was a contract 
and ordered the case to be tried to determine the dam-
ages, the defendants' counsel reserved the right to pTe-
sent the evidence to the jury not for the purpose of hav-
ing the jury rule on the question decided by the court, 
but merely so that it could have the whole picture before 
it and know what the case was about in assessing the 
damages, (R. 31). There is. no evidence in the record 
that the plaintiff ever withheld its consent that the trial 
judge might consider all of the evidence including the de-
positions for the p·urpose of determining as a matter of 
law whether there was or was not a contract. In fact, 
the stipulation, in which the depositions were incorpo-
rated in full, was for the very purpose of enabling the 
court to rule on the _question as a matter of law, the de-
fendants only reserving the right to prove a custom as to 
one phase of the Specifications in the event that should 
be necessary to the decision of the case, and the plain tiff 
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reserving the right to object to the introduction of testi-
lnony relative to any such custom, (R. 28-29, 49, 50). 
At the close of the pre-trial conference the court 
advised that he had enough information on which he 
thought he could rule whether there was a contract or not 
and 'vhether he could disn1iss the action, ( R. 51). He at 
that time invited both parties to make 1notions. The de-
f~ndants 1noved for a dis1nissal of the case, (R. 53), and 
the plaintiff n1oved for a judg1nent of liability against the 
defendants with the only issue to be submitted at the trial 
being the da1nages to which the plaintiff might be en-
titled, (R. 52). Thereupon the court made and entered 
its pre-trial order indicating that the issue of law to be 
determined was "\vhether a contract had been entered into 
between the plaintiff and the defendants. The pre-trial 
order further provided that if there were no contract, 
then the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed with 
prejudice, but if there were a contract between the par-
ties, there would then be a question of fact as to the 
1neasure of the damages to be awarded the plaintiff, (R. 
56). The pre-trial order further provided that all plead-
ings were 1nerged in the pre-trial ordeT and the only 
issues of law or of fact to be detern1ined upon the trial 
of the lawsuit were those contained in the orde~r, (R. 57). 
Arguments on the motion were heard on October 20, 
1951, and each party submitted written memorandums in 
support of his position which are a part of this record, 
(R. 67-96). On Octobe~r 26, 1951, a minute entry was 
made, by the court indicating that the defendants' motion 
to dismiss was granted and the plaintiff's motion denied, 
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(R. 59). On Dece1nber 5, 1 D31, a for1nal order disinissing 
the nrtion 'Yas signed by Judge Ellett and entered b~- the 
Clerk, ( R. 60). ~rhis order had been prepared by plain-
tiff's attorneys and subn1itted by the1n to the court for 
s1gn1ng-. 
THE E\~IDENCE 
The facts presented to the court by deposition, stipu-
lation or exhibits are as follo:\vs: 
Prior to June :20, 1950, the· United States Army 
Engineers issued an Invitation to contractors to submit 
bids for the construction of fire"\valls in cer.tain buildings 
located at the l~ tah General Depot, Ogden, Utah, in strict 
accordance "Tith Plans and Specifications prepared there-
for, (R. 15, 35). The Specifications, (Exhibit "A"), had 
been an1ended by Addendum No. 1, (Exhibit "B"), dated 
June 12, 1950, (R. 15). The Invitation for Bids wa~ in-
cluded within the S-pecifications and is found on the first 
page thereof. Paragraph 3 of the Invitation for Bids 
reads as follows: 
"The right is reserved, as the interest of the 
Government may require, to reject any and all 
bids, to waive any informality in bids received, 
and to accept or reject any or all items of any bid, 
unless the bidder qualifies such bid by specific 
limitation." 
The plaintiff was a California corporation with of-
fices in Inglewood, California, (R. 14), and prior to June 
20, 1950, was preparing estimates as general contractor 
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for the sub1nission of a bid on this firewall project, (R. 
15). Richard C. Riding conducted all of the preliminary 
negotiations and all of the work on behalf of the plaintiff 
in connection with subn1itting its bid on the· project, 
(Deposition 5, R. 15). 
On or about June 20, 1950, Riding contacted Thomas 
B. Child, one of the defendant partners, by telephone and 
asked Child if he wished to submit a bid for the brick 
work. Child replied that he would if he could see the 
drawings and specificati<?ns. Accordingly, on the evening 
of June 20, 19i50, Riding delivered to Mr. Child at his 
horne a set of the drawings and specifications and left 
them with Child. No copy of Addendum No.1 or the Plan 
in connection therewith was ever furnished to Child by 
Riding or Daum, and Child had never seen Addendum 
No. 1 and knew nothing about it at the time of making 
his bid, (Deposition 6, 7, 8, 94, R. 15). 
On the 1norning of June 22, 1950, Child telephoned 
his bid on the brick work to Mr. Riding's home at Tooele. 
Riding was not in but Mrs. Riding took down the bid in 
the total sum of $91,392.00 for the brick work. The bid 
opening was scheduled for 2:00 P.M. June 22, 1950, and 
prior to that time the plaintiff submitted in one lump 
sum its bid as general contractor for the entire project, 
which with rolling steel doors, was in the sum of $190,-
392.00, (R. 16). 
Prior to submitting its bid the plaintiff had also re-
quested bids for the brickwork from other subcontrac-
tors, two of whom were Alvin Watkins and Henry L. 
Ashton. Watkin's bid, according to Riding, was $151,-
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734.00 and Ashton's bid "'"as $105,000.00. Riding clahued 
that .. A.shton had n1ade a n1istake as to the date of the bid 
opening and that his bid "'"as actually not received until 
one hour after the tin1e set for bid opening, (Deposition 
16, 17) ... A. fourth bid for the brick\vork 'vas subsequently 
obtained from Clark Ivory in the sum of $95,000.00 and a 
subcontract \vas in fact entered into between the plain-
tiff and Clark Ivory in that stun for the brick\vork, (De-
position 17, R. 17, 48, 49, Exhibit "F"). 
The brickwork was covered by Section 3 of the Speci-
fications, (Exhibit ''A"), found at Page 3.1 thereof. Para-
graph 3-01 reads as follows: "This section covers all 
masonry work." Other sections of the S.pecifications re-
lated to general conditions, special conditions, earth-
work, concrete, sheet metal work, miscellaneous metal, 
carpentry, roofing and removal and salvage of roof 
trusses. 
Addendum No. 1, (Exhibit "B"), provided for the 
use of sliding instead of rolling fire doors in the fire-
walls, and attached thereto is a drawing showing the 
wall construction for the use of the sliding doors. It 
also changed Sheet 2 of the original Plans requiring "re-
inforced pilaster footings," and also provided: "Masonry 
work ·shall not be started until concrete foundation has 
been in place at least seven days." 
According to both Child and Riding the next conver-
sation between them took place by telephone. a day or two 
after the bids were· opened, (Deposition 1'5, 96}. Both 
testified that Riding told Child that his bid was low for 
the brick work and that Child was requested to confirm 
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his bid in writing 'vhich Child did by letter dated June 
23, 1950, (Deposition 1-1-, 19, 96, 97. R. 17 -18). The writ-
ten bid \Y-as the sarne as the verbal bid except that the 
written bid contained a post script, "add for each fire-
door if filled $175.00," which was not included in the 
verbal bid, (Deposition 11-13, 94, 95, R. 18, 39). This post 
script was written in by Child because Riding in this 
telephone conversation asked what charges there would 
be if the firedoors referred to in the Specifications were 
bricked in, (R. 18-19). Child further testified that in this 
conversation Riding said : 
"You know how things are. It takes the Gov-
ernment quite a while to decide· what they want, 
but I think after we get things fixed up for it we 
will give you a form of contract." (Deposition 97, 
R. 17). 
Child further testified that Riding at this time gave hin1 
to understand that the plaintiff did not have the job, 
(Deposition 97, R. 17). 
According to Riding the next conversation which he 
had with Child as near as he could reme-mber wa.s about 
July 3, (Deposition 19, R .. 20). At this time he called 
to see about placing of reinforcing in the brick work and 
asked Child if he wanted to place it himself or through 
another subcontractor, to which Child repJied that he 
would rather place it himself p·rovided it was all bent, 
cut and designed properly, (Deposition 20, R. 20). Child 
admitted having a conversation with Riding where men-
tion was made about placing of reinforced steel on the 
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job, but said that thi~ occurred in eonnection 'vi th the 
previou~ telephone conYer:sa.tion a day or two after the 
bids \Yere opened, (Dep·osition 98, 99, R. 20). Whatever 
the date of this conYersation \Yas, Riding admitted that 
the plaintiff did not at the tin1e thereof have any contract 
\Yith the Govern1nent and had not accepted Child's pro-
posa1, but that the conversation \vas still of a preliminary 
nature, (Deposition :20, R. 20). l\Ir. Riding testified as 
follows: 
~'Q. ..At this tin1e (of the conversation regarding 
placing the reinforcing steel) you didn't have 
any contract yourself with the government, 
did you? 
A. No. 
Q. And of course you hadn't given Mr. Child 
any contract or accepted his prop,osal, had 
you? 
A. No. 
Q. This was still just preliminary negotiation, 
is that correct~ 
A. That is right." (Deposition 20, R. 20). 
By letter dated June 29, 1950, addressed to plaintiff 
at its Inglewood, California office, the Corp·s of Engi-
neers advised plaintiff that its bid had been accepted in 
the sum of $190,392.00 and enclosed a contract for sig-
nature which plaintiff signed and returned, (R. 19, 20). 
While the general contract between the Government and 
the plaintiff was dated June 29, the contract was admit-
tedly not signed by the plaintiff on that date as it was 
mailed out from the Engineer's Office in San F'rancisco 
to the plaintiff's office in Inglewood, California, by letter 
dated June 29, 1950, (R. 19). Under date of July 10, 1950, 
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the engineers issued for1nal notice to the plaintiff to 
proceed and to commence the work within ten days after 
receipt of notice. This communication was received by 
the plaintiff at Inglewood, California, on July 13, (R. 21). 
On July 11, 1950, plaintiff mailed a letter from its 
Inglewood, California office to the defendants enclosing 
contract for signature. This letter with the proposed 
contract was received by defendants at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, about July 13 or 14, (R. 21, 22). A copy of the 
proposed subcontract is in the record marked Exhibit 
"C." It was signed on behalf of plaintiff by Wade A. 
Perong, Vice-President. The contract was a printed 
form contract with certain words typed in, including the 
following: 
"TIME IS THE ESSENC·E OF' THIS CON-
TRACT. GENERAL CONTRACT TO BE COM-
PLETED WITHIN 120 CALEND·AR DAYS. 
$50.00 PER DAY PENALTY THEREAF·TER-
SUB-CONTRACTOR TO COMPLETE HIS 
WORK AS S.CHEDULED." 
According to both p·arties the next conversation 
which they had was by telephone and took place on July 
14, (Deposition 20-21, 99-100, R. 22). At this time accord-
ing to Riding he called Child for an appointment to have 
him go to Ogden, meet the rest of the: subcontractors 
and get Child's opinions of how he would like to handle 
his part of the work. According to Riding Child made an 
appointment to ride up with him to Ogden the following 
morning and no mention was made to Child about any 
contract that was mailed out from the plaintiff's Ingle-
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'vood Office, and so far as Riding then kne'v Child had 
not received any such contrart, (Deposition 20, 21, R. 22). 
Child's version of this conversation was that Riding had 
called hin1 and "~anted hin1 to go up to Ogden and go over 
the job 'Yith hin1, but that he told Riding that he had re-
ceiYed a form of contract fron1 the plaintiff; that he and 
his partners had 1net together and decided that the con-
tract was not in conformity 'vith their p·roposal and that 
they were not going to sign the job up, (Deposition 99, 
R. 25 ). 
The next conversation between Riding and Child 
took place at Child's home in Salt Lake on the following 
morning, to-wit, July 15, (Deposition 21-22, 100, R. 23, 
25). According to Riding at this time Child told him 
that he had met with his brothers the night before and 
they had decided not to go through with the contract; 
that the contract was lying on the table and was dated 
July 11, (Deposition 22); that Child objected to the 
$50.00 a day penalty provision in the typewritten insert 
in the proposed contract, (Deposition 23, R. 23), reading 
as follows: 
"Time is of the essence of this contract. Gene-
ral contract to be completed within 120 days. 
$50.00 per day penalty thereafter. Subcontractor 
to comp·lete his work as scheduled." 
Riding testified that he offered to strike the $50.00 
a day penalty clause and initial it then and there, but 
he did not recall offering to strike the time limit feature 
fron1 the contract. Riding testified that he was not an 
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officer of the plaintiff corporation, (Deposition 23, R. 
23); that there was no schedule attached to the subcon-
tract for1n and nothing in the S·pecifications showing the 
manner in which the defendants' work would be sched-
uled, and that nothing had ever been discussed or agreed 
upon with the defendants as to any schedule of work by 
them or the other subcontractors so that the schedule 
referred to in the typewritten insert in the subcontract 
agreement was something that would have to be worked 
out by conversation and dealings with all of the subcon-
tractors and the plaintiff, (Deposition 24-26, R. 23). Rid-
ing also testified that he told Child that the penalty pro-
vision in the proposed subcontract agreement should not 
have been in the-re; that it wasn't according to the Speci-
fications and his office had no reason for putting it in, 
(Deposition 27, 28, 102, R. 23). Child testified that in this 
conversation he told Riding that the time limit and penal-
ty clause were not according to their proposal and could 
not be acce·pted in view of conditions such as the Korean 
War; that he also mentioned Addendum No.1 which was 
referred to in the contract but which he· had never seen. 
He claimed that Riding never offered to strike anything 
from the contract and that he took it in any event that 
Riding didn't have the right to alter the contract but this 
would have to be done by the people, in plaintiff's Cali-
fornia office who had made the contract and sent it to 
him. Child also claimed that in this conversation Riding 
said that there· was no time limit in the Specifications and 
that the plaintiff had no business writing it in the~ con-
tract, (Deposition 101-102, R. 25, 26). Also in connection 
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with this conYersation Riding clailned that he brought up 
the question of brick and asked ~lr. c~hild \\~hat he should 
do about the brick: that Child said he had on order one 
1nillion t\YO hundred thousand briek for the project and 
would turn it oYer to hi1n, (R. ~3-~4). Riding further 
testified as follo,vs: 
HQ. Did he say he had an order, or did he say 
he \vould do \vhat he could with the brick coin-
pany to get your order~ Do you remember 
specifically on that~ 
A. That I can't say, if he directly had an order, 
but he told me he had on order one million 
two hundred thousand brick for this particu-
lar project. 
Q. You can state then that prior to the time this 
contract was mailed out to him by your Ingle-
wood office, this contract dated July 11th, 
~Ir. Child would have no possible basis of 
holding you under any agreement, would he~ 
l\IR. WATSON: We object to that as 
argumentative and asking for a conclusion. 
MR. STRONG: I will re-frame the ques-
tion. 
Q. Prior to the time this contract dated July 11th 
was sent out, Mr. Child would have no basis 
for making any order of brick, would he~ 
A. He should. 
Q. He had never received any word prior to that 
time from you or your company relative to 
this bid proposal he had submitted~ 
A. He knew he was low bidder. 
Q. That is all he knew though~ 
A. And the general practice would be to pTotect 
you on your buying power on your low bid. 
Q. I mean he didn't have any official right, or 
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any confirmation from your office prior to 
the· time this contract was mailed out~ 
A. No." (Deposition 27). 
* * •JI: 
"Q. You mentioned about the brick, and you talk-
ed about him protecting you or something on 
the order of brick or arrangements he had. 
What was the outcome of that~ 
A. He immediately got on the phone and caHed 
a man, Calhoun, if I know the name properly 
-or Cahoon-and told him to transfer his 
order to R. J. Daum, that I would be right 
down to see him. 
Q. Did he say 'his order,' those words~ 
A. I couldn't swear to that. 
* * * 
Q. Whether it was an order or just a statement 
to the brick yard, you don't know, do you~ 
A. No." (Deposition 28). 
Mr. Child testified that Riding mentioned a diffi- . 
culty about getting bricks and requested him to turn over 
any priority which he might have. Child then testified: 
"Q. What did you say~ (Deposition 108). 
"A. I told him I would call up; any influence I 
had to get him the bricks I would sure be glad 
to help him to do it. 
Q. H.ad you made arrangements for the brick? 
A. No; I had told the~m tentatively I was figur-
ing that job, that I was expecting to sign up 
with Daum for the job. 
Q. And you had p·ut in an order for a million and 
some· hundred thousand brick~ 
A. No, I just told them I expected to get the job. 
Q. Did you at that time call Mr. Cahoon and ask 
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hiin to turn oyer an order yon had for brick 
to ~lr. Riding'? 
H~IR. STRONG: I object to that question 
on the ground it is asslnning something not in 
evidence. He has just stated he had no order 
"yith the brick company." 
(last question read by the reporter.) 
_A._. I think I spoke to nir. Andrew Bath, the 
salesn1an there, and told him I wasn't going to 
ha-ve anything to do \vith the job up there 
no\Y, and that anything he could do to help 
them get the material I wanted him to do it. 
Q. Do you recall the substance of your arrange-
ment as to price for the brick on the job~ 
A. No; they give us all the same price. 
Q. I an1 asking if there had been a price given to 
you on this? 
A. Yes, there had. 
Q. Did that price include a price as to the de-
livery on the job as \veil as a price to deliver 
to the factory~ 
A. When I figured the job I asked what the price 
would be delivered at the job.'' (De·position 
109, R. 17, 24, 25). 
The conversations referred to above were the only 
conversations that took place between Riding and Child 
and were all of the conversations between the parties 
that would have any bearing at all on the issue. involved 
in this case. 
It is conceded that the defendants never did sign 
any contract to do the work and never did any work on 
the project, (R. 26, 28, 48). Thereafter, the plaintiff 
entered into a subcontract agreement with Clark Ivory 
to do the brick work for $95,000.00, (R~ 49, Exhibit "F"). 
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This contract was identical with that submitted to Child 
with the exception that the features to which Child ob-
jected as he-reinafter pointed out were deleted therefrom. 
POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
DISCLOSES THAT THERE WAS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN 
THE PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANTS. 
POINT II. 
THE TRANSMITTAL OF THE SUBCONTRACT FORM 
WAS NOT A CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ACCEPT-
ANCE NOR MERELY A WRITTEN MEMORIAL OF A PRE-
VIOUS CONTRACT. 
POINT III. 
THE PROPOSED SUBCONTRACT ITSELF WAS NOT 
AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE DEFENDANTS' BID BUT CON-
TAINED NEW MATERIAL WHICH MADE IT A COUNTER-
PROPOSAL THEREBY REJECTING DEFENDANTS' BID. 
POINT IV. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED TO DENY 
THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT. PROMISSORY ES-
TOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY. 
POINT V. 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL IS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE COURT'S GRANTING OF THE MOTION TO DIS-
MISS. NO JURY ISSUES WERE PRESENT. 
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POINT \'I. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
FORMAL WRITTEN MOTION WITH NOTICE THEREOF 
W'"ERE NOT REQUIRED AND IN ANY EVENT WERE 
\VAlVED BY THE PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT . 
. ARGU~IENT 
POINT I. 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
DISCLOSES THAT THERE WAS NO CONTRACT BET\V.EEN 
THE PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANTS . 
.. A.ppellant contends that the plaintiff by acts and 
conduct had accepted the defendants' bid and that a bind-
ing contract was thereby created. In our argument we 
"'"ill consider the acts and conduct allegedly constituting 
an acceptance in the order set forth in the appellant's 
brief. 
Appellant at page 15 of its brief refers to a state-
ment made by Child in a telephone conversation between 
him and Riding on June 23 or 24. In this conversation 
it was undisputed that Riding told Child that Child's bid 
was low for the brick work. Riding in his deposition did 
not testify in this conversation or a.t any other time that 
he had ever agreed to give Child a contract. Child testi-
fied that Riding in this conversation said : 
"You know how things are. It takes the Gov-
ernment quite a 'vhile to decide what they want, 
but I think after we get things fixed up for it we 
will give you a form of contract." 
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We submit that the staternent quoted above did not 
show an acceptance of Child's bid by Riding. At most it 
merely indicated that Child might get a form of contract. 
If Riding had intended to accept Child's bid at this time, 
he would have said so without equivocation. His state-
rnents in other conversations hereinafter set forth clearly 
show that he did not consider there had been any accept-
ance of the! defendants' bid. 
Defendants were one of several subcontractors from 
whom the plaintiff had requested bids for the brick work. 
The mere fact that the defendants' bid may have been 
low, and even though plaintiff may have used defendants' 
figure in submitting its own lump sum bid on the whole 
project to the· Government, would not in and of itself obli-
gate the defendants to perform merely because the Gov-
ernment accepted plaintiff's bid and subsequently entered 
in to a con tract with it. See Williston on 0 on tracts, Sec. 
31, pages 7 4-75 : 
"* * * an ordinary advertisement for bids or 
tenders is not itself an offer but the bid or tender 
is an offer which creates no right until accepted. 
Even though the charter of a municipality ex-
pressly requires that a contract shall be awarded 
to the. lowest bidder, a contract is not formed until 
the lowest b'id is in fact accepted. Though the 
municipality can make a contract with no other 
person than the lowest bidder, it need make no 
con tract with him." 
The plaintiff could accep·t or reject defendants' pro-
posal or do the brick work itself. It had not promised 
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that the defendants 'vould be given the brich: "·ork in the 
event that plaintiffs bid 'Ya~ lo,v, and plaintiff 'vas 
a"~arded the gene-ral contract. Paragraph 3 of the In-
vitation for Bids (Specification~ Exhibit ""_:\_") reads as 
follo,vs: 
HThe right is reserved, as the interest of the 
Governn1ent 1nay require to reject any and all 
bids, to "\Yaive any inforn1ality in bids received, 
and to accept or reject any or all items of 
any bid, unless the bidder qualifies such bid by 
specific limitation." 
Plaintiff clearly understood that there was reserved 
to it the right to reject or accept the defendants' proposal 
as plaintiff alone saw fit. This was the provision in the 
Invitation for Bids. While that pTovision was 'vith refer-
ence to the entire contract, nonetheless the plaintiff by 
its very position in this suit and by the proposed contract 
which it subsequently tendered the defendants has taken 
the position that it had all rights as against the defend-
ants which the Government had or ·might have under the 
Specifications against the plaintiff. The third paragraph 
of the proposed subcontract agreement, (Exhibit "C"), 
which plaintiff tendered defendants, p·rovides: 
"* * * the intention being that with respect to this 
subcontract, everything required of and binding 
upon the Contractor shall be required of and bind-
ing upon the Sub-contractor, and all rights, privi-
leges, options, and the exercise of discretion with 
respect to said work reserved by or given to the 
Owner and the Architect may be maintained and 
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exercised with andjor against the Sub-contrac-
tor." 
There had, accordingly, been no conditional accept-
ance of the defendants' bid and there was no promise to 
give the defendants a contract when and if the Govern-
ment accepted the plain tiff's bid. 
It is further contended in appellant's brief, page 16, 
that the conversation between the parties regarding the 
placing of reinforcing steel indicates that there had been 
an acceptance of the defendants' proposal. There is some 
discrepancy between the parties as to when this conversa-
tion took place, Child claiming that Riding had talked 
with him over the telpehone about placing of reinforced 
steel on the job, but that this was on June 23 or 24 when 
he was asked to confirm his verbal bid and was merely 
for the purpose of determining just what was included 
within Child's bid proposal. Riding was not sure but as 
near as he could remember the conversation took place 
about July 3. However, Riding admitted that at the time 
of this conversation the p·laintiff did not have any con-
tract with the Government and further admi.tted that the 
plaintiff had not accepted the defendants' proposal or 
given the defenda.nt any contract, but that the conversa-
tion was all of a preliminary nature. The testimony of 
both Riding and Child in co,nnection with this conversa-
tion conclusively indicates that it was of a preliminary 
nature. Both clearly understood that there had been no 
acceptance of the defendants' proposal. Both stated that 
the conversation was of a preliminary nature. Both 
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recogni~~ed that ~o1nething further nnu~t be required be-
fore there could be any rontract. 
The next condurt or action relied upon b~, appellant 
in its brief to ~ho'v an aeeeptance pertains to conversa-
tion bet,Yeen C~hild and Riding on July 15 relative to 
brirks to be u~ed on the job ..... \ppellant in its brief, page 
lT, contends that the defendants had placed an order for 
one 1nillion t\YO hundred thousand brick vvith the brick 
company. This is not the case. Child had not ordered 
any brick for the job. There is nothing whatsoever in the 
record to support the contention made by counsel for the 
appellant. In this conversation Riding readily admitted 
that he couldn't say whethe·r Child told him he had an 
order for the brick and "couldn't swear" that Child ac-
tually used the vvord '~order." Child testified that when 
preparing his bid he had called the brick yard and got a 
figure for the price of one million two hundred thousand 
brick delivered at the job site. There is nothing unusual 
about this practice. In fact, it would have been impos-
sible for Child to have given a bid on the brick work with-
out first knowing what the cost of the brick would be. 
Counsel for appellant in examining Child in his deposi-
tion attempted to have him testify that he had ordered 
the brick but this he did not do. He said that he had not 
ordered the brick, and did not have an order for the 
brick. He merely agreed to use his influence with the 
brick yard to help the plaintiff get the brick. Here again 
we submit that the evidence from both parties clearly 
shows that Child had not placed an ordeT for any brick. 
There was, accordingly, nothing in this conversation to 
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indicate an acceptance. Furtherinore, Riding at this time 
clearly understood that there had been no acceptance 
of the defendants' proposal. He testified that at the time 
of this conversation the defendants did not have any 
official right or any confirmation of their bid from the 
plaintiff. 
In support of its argument under this heading the 
appellant cites Thornton v. Pasch, 104 Utah 313, 139 Pac. 
(2d) 1002. Counsel, ho-vvever, carefully refrained from 
setting forth the facts in the Thornton case because they 
are definitely not in point. In the Thornton case the de-
fendants "\vere in the roofing business. The defendant 
Pasch asked the plaintiff to make a bid on the hauling of 
roofing for certain defense homes. The plaintiff went to 
Pasch's office and wrote out his bid on a scratch pad. 
Pasch took the bid and said he would take it up with 
his partner and let the plaintiff know. About a week or 
ten days later Pasch told the plaintiff's wife over the 
telephone that they had a contract for her husband to 
sign and asked her to have him come in and. sign it as 
soon as possible. In response to this the plaintiff called 
at Pasch's office, examined the docum.ent which was pre-
pared for his signature. He did not sign it at that time, 
but the next day returned and signed. it in Pasch's pr-es-
ence after a short discussion which resulted in some 
changes. The original was left with Pasch and the plain-
tiff received a copy. Neither the original or the copy 
were ever signed by the defendant. The agreement 
signed by plaintiff in Pasch's office was in the fo·rm of a 
contract and not an offer. Pasch told the plaintiff that 
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the 1cork ~vo·uld be ready about 111 a.y 26. The·se facts ae-
cording to the lTtah Court indicated an acceptance' by the 
defendant of the plaintiff's bid. However, in the case· at 
bar the parties by their testiinony readily conceded that 
all of these ronversations and dealings prior to receipt 
of the tendered subcontract ''Tere 1nerely of a preliminary 
nature and did not constitute an acceptance of the· defend-
ants' proposal. 
Appellant also relies on the case of Raff Co. v. 
Murphy, 1-±7 Atl. 709. The facts in that case are clearly 
distinguis'hable from those in the case at bar. There the 
plaintiff was engaged in the heating business and the de:-
fendant in the plumbing business. The plaintiff desired 
to submit a bid on a contract which called for both plumb-
ing and heating. Since the plumbing was out of plaintiff's 
line, the plaintiff asked Murphy if he was interested in 
submitting a figure for the p~lumbing. Murphy agreed 
to do so, u on condition that the plaintiff would not obtain 
figures fro1n anyone else for that work, and would give 
them the job if the plaintiff secured the contract, and 
these conditions were accepted" by the the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff company thereupon incorporated the de-
fendant's bid in a combined bid covering both the heating 
and plumbing work and submitted it. Plaintiff was 
awarded the bid and telephoned one of the· defendants 
advising him at which time this defendant informed him 
of his pleasure and ap·preciation. Some two days later 
the defendants called up plaintiff's office, advised that 
there had been a mistake in their bid, and that they would 
not go through with it. 
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In that case the plaintiff at the defendant's insistence 
refrained from seeking any other bids and promised to 
give the defendants the job if the plaintiff secured a con-
tract. However, in the instant case the plaintiff had se-
cured bids from other parties, did not promise to give 
the defendants a subcontract even though they might be 
low bidders, and, in fact, reserved the right to reject any 
and all bids. The Raff case accordingly is not in point. 
We submit that the acts and conduct of the parties 
shows beyond question that there had been no acceptance 
of the defendants' proposal, and that both Child and Rid-
ing so understood. 
POINT II. 
THE TRANSMITTAL OF THE SUBCONTRACT FORM 
WAS NOT A CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ACCEPT-
ANCE NOR MERELY A WRITTEN MEMORIAL OF A PRE-
VIOUS CONTRACT. 
At pages 20 and 21 of appellant's brief it is argued 
that the transmittal of the subcontract form was a confir-
mation of a previous acceptance· and that the subcontract 
form wa.s merely a written memorial of the! contract so 
created. In our discussion under Point I we have shOiwn 
that there had been no accep·tance of the defendants' pro-
posal by any action or conduct. The:re, accordingly, was 
no contract prior to the time that the! subcontract form 
was mailed out. The mailing of the subcontract form, 
therefore, could not be a confirmation of any previous 
acceptance. Furthermore, as we shall point out in our 
discussion under Point III, the subcontract form itself 
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\Yas not an acceptance of the defendants' proposal. Coun-
sel for appellant quote fron1 Restaternent of the La\v of 
Contracts, Chapter 3, Section 26 and also quote a por-
tion of the conunent under that section. lio,vever, they 
neglected to quote the ren1a.ining portion of the cornn1ent 
which reads as follo,vs : 
·'On the other hand, if the preliminary agree-
ment is incomplete, it being apparent that the 
determination of certain details is deferred until 
the writing is made out; or if an intention is ma.ni-
fested in any uJay that legal obliga.tions between 
the parties shall be deferred until the writing 
is made, the preliminary negotiat-ions a.nd agree-
nz ents do not constitu.te a contract." 
And again: 
"If the parties indicate that the expected 
document is to be the exclusive operative consum-
mation of the negotiation, their preceding com-
munications will not be operative as offeT or ac-
ceptance." 
In order for the transmittal of the subcontract form 
to be a mere memorial or confirmation of a previous con-
tract two things must accordingly be present: (1) The 
parties must have definitely agreed on all of the terms 
of the proposed contract so that nothing in addition re--
mained to be determined by the writing; (2) The parties 
must have intended that the acts and conduct should con-
stitute a binding agreement. 
(1) By reference to Child's pToposal, (R. 18), it 
will be observed that the defendants merely proposed to 
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furnish labor and 1naterials to co1nplete the brick work 
according to Plans and Specifications for a specified 
sun1. No mention was made as to the time or manner in 
which the defendants should be paid. No mention was 
1nade as to any time limit within which the defendants 
would complete the brick work, nor as to any penalty 
that might be applied. No mention was n1ade of any sched-
ule under which the defendants were to complete their 
work. No mention was made that the defendants would 
waive any rights or claims which they might have against 
the contractor or any other subcontractor by reason of any 
da1nages caused by any act, omission or delay on the part 
of the contractor or other subcontractor. No mention was 
made of Addendum No. 1. No understanding had be~en 
reached as to whether the subcontractor would furnish 
a performance bond. All of these matteTs were specifi-
cally covered in the tendered subcontract agreement 
which also provided that there were no understandings 
or agreements except as expressly stated in the, subcon-
tract form. There is nothing in any of the convers~ations 
between Riding and Child showing any agreement on any 
of these particulars. Such an agreement would be neces-
sary for a complete understanding and to make-a definite 
and binding agreement. If, as ap·pellant contends, there 
was an agreement prior to the time that the subcontract 
form was mailed out, what were the defendants' rights 
under such agreement~ When was it to commence its 
work~ When was it to receive its pay~ What time limit 
or penalty, if any, was to be in foree~ Where was the 
plaintiff hound to any contract under which it could be 
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sued~ These and nun1erous other questions 1nust be 
ans"~ered and decided before there could be any 1neeting 
of the minds on any contrart. ''; e, accordingly, submit 
that the parties had not definitely agreed on the terms 
of any rontract and that the transn1ittal of the subcon-
tract forin could not, therefore, be a 1nere confirmation 
or meinorial of a preYious contract. 
( 2) The parties by their o,,~n acts and admissions 
clearly indicated that all of their conversations were of a 
preliminary nature and that a contract must be written 
before either part:~ could be bound. Riding, in his tele-
phone conversation with Child, a day or two following 
the bid opening said he thought the defendants might 
receive a contract. This in and of itself indicated that 
the submission of a contract was to constitute the con-
summation of any acceptance of the defendants' p~roposal. 
Furthermore, in the next conversation betwe·en the par-
ties relative to the placing of reinforcing steel Riding at 
that time specifically stated that the conversation was 
"just preliminary negotiations" and that the p~laintiff 
hadn't "accepted" Child's proposal. Riding further testi-
fied in his conversation that took place at Child's home 
on July 15 just after the subcontract form had been 
mailed out that the schedule referred to in thH tendered 
subcontract form was itself something that was not co:v-
ered either by the Sp·ecifications or the Plans and which 
would even then have to be worked out in negotiations 
between the parties. He also testified in -that conversa-
tion that prior to the time that the written contract was 
mailed out the defendants had no official rights under 
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their proposal or any confirmation at all from the plain-
tiff's office. Child, himself, had been given to under-
stand that his propoS'al had not been accepted and that 
it would have to be accepted by the· plaintiff's California 
Office. The first communication which the defendants 
received froln the plaintiff's c·alifornia office was the 
communication dated July 11 which enclosed the pro-
posed subcontract form. 
We submit that neither of the necessary requisites 
are present to make the tendered subcontract agreement 
a mere memorial of a previously accepted contract. The 
parties had not agreed definitely on the terms of any 
such contract, and, furthermore·, they clearly and unmis-
takeably indicated that their conversations were only 
preliminary negotiations and that all legal obligations be-
tween them should be deferred until a contract was made. 
The case of Calumet Refining Co. v. Star Lubricat-
ing Co., 64 Utah 358, 230 Pac. 1028, is cited at page 21 of 
appellant's brief. In that case the· defendant had pur-
chased from the plaintiff on previous occasions at least 
5 carloads of lubricating oil. Thereafter one of plain-
tiff's representatives entered into nego;ti~ations with the 
defendant for the sale of such oil as the defendant might 
need. At the termination of these negotiations the de~ 
fendant delivered to the plaintiff an order or contract 
for the purchase of one thousand barrels of oil. There 
was an exchange of telegrams between the parties. The 
so called acceptance telegram contained the. additional 
provision: "Te-rms one per cent ten days or thirty day 
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trade acceptance." It 'vas contended that the insertion 
of these tern1s in the teleg·rant constituted a qualified 
acceptance. Ho,vever, the evidence indicated that in the 
prior dealings between the parties the time and terms 
of payn1ent had been the same as those specified in the 
acceptance telegran1 and that these were the usual terms 
of payrnent. Furthern1ore, on the same date that the tele-
gram "~as sent the defendant gave the plaintiff an order 
for the ship1nent of one carload of oil under the very 
terms stated in the confirming telegram and this order 
"~as filled by the plaintiff. The Utah Sup-reme Court 
merely held that in view of the former relationship be-
tween the parties and because of the testimony as to the 
custom of the trade and the fact that the plaintiff had ac-
cepted one order and filled it under the terms called for 
in the telegram, the insertion of the words in the confirm-
ing telegram did not constitute a conditional acceptance. 
There had been a contemporaneous construction on the 
part of both parties by the acceptance and filling of the 
order under the very terms specified in the telegram 
which showed a complete meeting of the minds. We sub-
mit that there is no such evidence in the case at bar, and, 
in fact, all of the eviden'Ce conclusively indicates that both 
parties clearly understood that their conver'S'ation and 
dealings were of a preliminary nature and that there 
could be no contract until a written form was signed be-
tween the parties. 
As indicated in the case of Wells Construction Co. 
v. Goder Incinerator Co., 217 N.W. 112: 
"At the outset of such an inquiry as this, 
there must be kept in mind the admonition of 
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Judge Taft (quoting fron1 Lyman v. Robinson, 14 
Allen (Mass.) 242), that 'care should always be 
taken not to construe' as a contract communica-
tions 'which the parties in tended only as a pre-
lin1inary negotiation,' and (quoting from Rossite 
v. Miller, 5 Ch. Div. 648), to prevent litigants from 
being 'entrapped into contracts * * * without the 
slightest ide'a that they were contracting.'" 
The entire te·stimony of the parties clearly indicates 
that they were simply negotiating for a possible contract 
and never went beyond that stage. No agreement was 
ever re'ached and no contract was ever made. In fact the 
essential terms to a definite contract had never been 
agreed upon. And it was the intention of both partie's 
that neither could be bound until there was a. written con-
tract. 
Whether plaintiff intended its proposed contract to 
be a rejection or not is wholly immaterial If it contained 
new and additional matter, as we shall see in our discus-
sion under Point III, it constituted a rejection as a mat-
ter of law. Child certainly construed the contract as a 
rejection of the offer and so notified Riding by telephone 
which was later eonfirmed in discussions at the Child 
home. 
POINT III. 
THE PROPOSED SUBCONTRACT ITSELF WAS NOT 
AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE DEFENDANTS' BID BUT CON-
TAINED NEW MATERIAL WHICH MADE IT A COUNTER-
PROPOSAL THEREBY REJECTING DEFENDANTS' BID. 
The defendants' letter of June 23, 1950, addressed 
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to the plaintiff \vas an offer \vhich required acceptance 
on the part of the plaintiff before there could be any 
contract. .A .. s \ve have heretofore seen in our discussions 
under Point8 I and II, there \Vas no acceptance by any act 
or c'onduct. The letter of July 11, 1950, forwarding a 
proposed subcontract for1n to the defendants was not 
an acceptance of the defendants' proposal. The proposed 
subcontract contained new material and was a counter-
proposal, W'"hieh rejected the defendants' previous offer. 
Thereafter, the defendants' offer could only be revived 
by a ne\v offer and such offer was never made. 
In considering this proposition it should be noted 
that while plaintiff's contract with the Governmen't was 
dated June 29, 1950, that it was not until July 11, 1950, 
that the plaintiff mailed to the defendants from its 
Inglewood Office a letter enclosing the proposed sub-
contract agreement. 
A comparison of the defendants' proposal of June 
23 with the tendered subcontract agreemen~t dated July 
11 conclusively shows tha;t the tendered subcontract 
agreement was not an acceptance of the defendants' p·ro-
posal but was in effeet a counter-proposal and thereby 
as a matter of law amounted to a rejection of the defend-
ants' proposal. 
L 
In the first place, the proposed subcontract agree-
ment atte·mpted to bind the defendants to perform the 
work according to the Plans and Specifications, "includ-
ing Addendum No. 1." It is undisputed that the plaintiff 
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never furnished the defendants Addendum No. 1 and that 
the defendants never saw Addendum No. 1 until after 
the controversy had arisen. Addendum No. 1 provided 
for the use of sliding instead of rolling fire doors in the 
firewalls, changed the original plans to require "rein-
forced pilaster footings," and also provided "Masonry 
work shall no1t be started until concrete foundation has 
been in place at least 7 days." This is important because 
the defendants had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
pouring of the concrete. This work would have to be done 
by the plaintiff or through some other subcontractor over 
whom the defendants would have no control. Further-
more, the pouring of the concrete itself would be depend-
ent upon other portions of the work to be performed by 
plaintiff or other subcontractors. Considering the 120 
day time limit and $50.00 per day penalty clause with 
which plaintiff attempted to saddle the defendants in the 
proposed subcontract agreement, this proposed 7 day 
limit could have disastrous results. There were 12 se·pa-
rate fire walls in all which would have to be laid in 4 
buildings. However, before any of these fire· walls could 
be started the work of clearing the area, cutting the 
roofs, tearing up the existing floors where the wall was 
to go, digging trenche·s and pouring concrete would have 
to take place and in addition the defendants would have 
to wait 7 days after the concrete had be·en poured on each 
of the 12 fire walls before the defendants could start their 
work on any of the walls, (R. 28, 4 7, 48, Deposition 39-
42), and there wa:s nothing in the con tract or in the speci-
fications which required the general contractor to follow 
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any specific schedule or to adopt any particular ti1ne 
lin1it in the pouring of the various foundations. The 
plaintiff, as general contraetor, 'vould, therefore, have it 
exclusively ""'ithin its po,ver to deter1nine when the de-
fendants could start 'vork on any of the 12 fire walls. 
It is contended by appellant at page 24 of its brief 
that this provision in the. Addendum· 1nade no change 
'vhatsoever over the original specifications and that it 
W'as trivial in any event. The answer to such argument 
lies in the fact that the Government in writing the Ad-
dendum certainly did not deem that the. change was tri-
vial or that it 'vas covered by the original Specifications, 
otherwise, there \vould have been no reason for includ-
ing the change in the Addendum. Furthermore, if Ad-
dendum No. 1, as claimed by plaintiff's counsel, did not 
include any new features, why was it necessary for the 
plaintiff to specifically insert in its proposed subcontract 
agreement that the defendants' work should be in accord-
ance with the Plans and S.pecifications, "including Ad-
dendum No. 1." We submit that the inclusion of Ad-
dendum No. 1 in the p-rop·osed subcontract agreement in-
dicates that :it contained p-rovisions covering the brick 
work which were not included in the original Plans and 
Specifications, and to which the plaintiff desired that the 
defendants should be subject. 
The app·ellant at page 25 of its brief further argues 
that any delay occasioned by the requirement that the 
concrete should be in place 7 days beforre any brick work 
should be started would be a delay occasioned on the part 
of the plaintiff or some other subcontractor for which the 
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hereafter (infra p·. 44-46) that this is not the case, be-
cause in the proposed subcontract agreement the defend-
ants were required to waive any and all claims for daln-
ages for any act, omission or delay caused by the plain-
tiff or any other subcontractor. 
II. 
The proposed subcontract agreement was in the 
main a printed form of contract, but there was specifical-
ly typed in the following provision: 
"Time is the essence of this contract. General 
contr'aet to be completed within 120 calendar days. 
$50.00 per day penalty thereafter-Subcontractor 
to complete his work as scheduled." 
This provision was a general time limit and penalty 
clause written into the Specifications to apply as between 
the Government and the plaintiff. It is true that such 
provision is for the whole project. However, by inserting 
such p·rovision in the proposed subcontract agreement, 
the plaintiff attempts not only to charge the defendants 
with the 120 day time li1nit and $50.00 per day penalty, 
but in addition thereto to impose upon the defendants a 
further and indefinite time limit since the defendants 
were compelled to complete the brick work not only with-
in the 120 day general time limit, but "as scheduled." 
It is undisputed that no schedule was attached to the 
tendered subcontract form showing the manner or time 
within which the defendants' work was to be completed. 
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It is further undisputed that nothing had ever been dis-
cussed or agreed upon het,veen Riding and Child as to 
any schedule or thne li1nit on Child's particular portion 
of the \York. It \Yas also undisputed that the work con-
sisted of seYeral different p·hases, only one of which, 
na.n1ely, the brick \vork, was to be performed by the· de-
fendants; that before the brick work could commence 
the buildings \vould have to be cleared by the Govern1nent 
where the \\~ork \vas going to take place. Everything 
would have to be moved out from this area. It would then 
be necessary to take down the existing trusses and a p1art 
of the roofing because the 12 brick walls would go right 
up through the ceiling. Then the concrete flooring where 
the walls were to go would have to be dug out, trenches 
would have to be made and the footings poured (R. 28, 
47, 48, Depositions 39-42). S-even days thereafter the 
brick work on such wall could commence. F'ollowing this 
there \vould be other work on the roof and roofing to 
complete each fire wall. Riding admitted that no time 
schedule for the various phases of the work had ever been 
agreed upon prior to or at the time the proposed sub-
contract agreement \vas mailed to the defendants. He ad-
mitted that this was something which would have to be 
worked out by future negotiations. 
The defendants took the position that. the general 
tilne lim.It and penalty clause in the Sp·ecifications had no 
application to their particular phase of the work. Section 
3 of the Specifications Page 3.1, Subsection 301, specifi-
cally provides : "This section covers all masonry work." 
C·hild testified that his bid was hased exclusively upon 
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this section of the Specifications and upon the Plans. 
'!,here is nothing whatsoever in the masonry section of 
the Specifications or in the Plans to indrcate any time 
limit or penalty clause for this particular phase of the 
work or in fact for the entire project itself. It is clear 
fro1n the conversations and dealings between the parties 
that no time limit or penalty clause was in the contem-
plation of either Riding or Child and that such was def-
initely understood by Riding wh'en he received the de-
fendants' proposal. The defendants' proposal as it was 
clearly understood by Riding was merely to comple,te the 
masonry work pursuant to the masonry section of the 
Specifications and the Plans without any reference to 
any time limit or penalty clause. This was definitely 
understood by Riding who testified that in the conversa-
tion with Child on July 15 after Child had received the 
proposed subcontract agreement that he told Child that 
the typewritten provision relative to the time limit and 
penalty should not have been in the subcontract agre·e-
ment; that it wasn't in the Specifications and that the 
pl'aintiff had no reason f'Or putting it in the contract. 
Furthermore, when the subcontract agreement with 
Clark Ivory was subsequently entered into by the plain-
tiff for the brick work, Riding wrdte in ink opposite the 
typewritten time limit and penalty provision in his own 
handwriting these words: "This is not called for in Gov-
ernment spec.", and initialled the same·. 
It is, therefore, appHrent that the defendants' bid 
was taken by Riding with the knowledge that there was to 
be no time limit or penalty provision at least insofar as 
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the defendantB '"ere concerned. The defendants' bid, 
therefore, 1nust be interpreted in the light in which it was 
so understood. See Restate1nent of the Law of Contracts, 
page 7 ±, Section 71, subsection (c) : 
·~Except as stated in Sections 55, 70, the un-
disclosed understanding of either party of the 
1neaning of his own 'Yords and other acts, or of the 
other party's words and other acts, is material 
in the formation of contracts in the following 
cases and in no others : 
(c) If either party knows that the other does not 
intend what his words or other acts express, 
this kno,vledge prevents such words or other 
acts from being operative as an offer or an 
acceptance." 
Both Riding and Child, the only persons with whom 
any dealings and conversations were had relative to the 
defendants' proposal, clearly and definitely understood 
that at least insofar as the brick work was concerned 
there 'vas to be no time limit or penalty provision. How-
ever, as we have heretofore indicated, not only was it an 
attempt to impose the general time limit upon Child, but 
to include an additional limit that the defendants had 
to complete their work "as scheduled" by the. plaintiff, 
which would leave the defendants completely at the: plain-
tiff's mercy as the plaintiff might give the defendants 
any particular S'chedule that it saw fit. 
At pages 22 and 23 of appell,ant's brief it is claimed 
that the defendants had notice when they comp~uted their 
bid of the 120 day time limit and $50.00 per day penalty 
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prov1s1on because of the provision in the special pro;vi-
sion of the Hpecifications. It is aecordingly argued that 
when the defendants rnade their bid they knew that time 
would be of the essence of their subcontract. In support 
of its position the appellant cites the case of Ehret Mag-
nesia Mfg. Co. v. Gothwaite, 149 Fed. (2d) 829. In 
that case Gothwaite was engaged in the construction of 
stea1n distribution systems. He entered into a written 
contract with the United States to furnish certain ma-
terials and perform certain labor in connection with the 
construction of a steam distribution system. The 1fag-
nesium Company agreed to supply the necessary pipe to 
Gothwaite and to do certain of the work "in accordance 
with plans and specifications." When the installation 
was about complet'e, it was discovered when the steam 
was turned on that heat had melted various sections of 
the asphalt water proofing covering the pipe, causing 
considerable damage, and to remedy the same Goth-
waite was put to considerable expense. He brought this 
suit to rec'Over the expense from the Magnesium c·om-
pany. One of the items of the plans and) specifications 
required the contractor to guarantee the work for a peri-
od of one year after completion. The plans and specifica-
tions further required that the insulated pipe should be 
"permanently waterproofed." Since the Magnesium 
Company agreed to supply the pipe according to the 
plans and specifications, the court held that it was liable 
to Gothwaite for damages since the pipe which it had 
furnished was not permanently waterproofed. 
In th'a t case the provision in the specifications to 
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\Yhich the :_j{ag-nesilnn (\)ulpany \Yas subjected related to 
the very phase of the \York \Yhich it had unde-rtook to 
perforin. It \Yas eontained \Yithin the very portion of the 
specifications relating- to pipe. The Magnesium Con1pany 
under these circu1nstances \Yas held subject to a provi-
sion of the specifications '"'·hich related to the very por-
tion of the \\~ork \Yhich it had agreed to supply or per-
forin. In the instant case, however, the provision with 
which the plaintiff seeks to charge the defendants was 
not contained in the ~Iasonry Section of the Sp-ecifica-
tions and further1nore the masonry section specifically 
provided that it included "All masonry work." 
The use of the "~ords '"pursuant to Plans and Specifi-
cations" in the defendants' proposal was for the 1nere 
purpose of identifying the brick work to be done, and the 
manner in which it should be done pursuant to the 
1nasonry subsection. It certainly was not the intention 
of the defendants to incorporate in their bid proposal 
all of the Plans and Specifications that might relate 
between the plaintiff and the Government. See Cum-
mings Construction Co. vs. Marbleloid Co., 51 Fed. (2d) 
906, wherein the Third Circuit Court of Appeals said: 
"It was far from the intention of the defen-
dant, when it entered into the contract to lay 
floors, to incorporate therein all the provisions 
of the plans and specifications in the contract 
between the plaintiff and the state of Maine." 
See also to the same effect Guerini Stone Company 
vs. P. J. Carlin Construction Company, 60 La\v Ed. 636: 
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"The reference in the subcontract to the 
drawings and specifications was evidently for 
the mere purpose of indicating what work was 
to he done, and in what manner done, by the 
subcontractor. Notwithstanding occasional expres-
sions of a different view (see Shaw v. First 
Baptist Church, 44 Minn. 22, 24, 46 N.W. 146; 
Avery v. Ionia County, 71 Mich. 538, 546, 547, 39 
NW. 7 42; Stein v. McCarthy, 120 Wis. 288, 295, 
97 N.W. 912), in our opinion the true rule, based 
upon sound reason and supported by the greater 
weight of authority, is that in the case of sub-
contracts, as in other cases of express agree-
ments in writing, a reference by the contracting 
parties to an extraneous writing for a particular 
purpose makes it a part of their agreement only 
for the purpose specified." 
It is further argued by counsel for appellant at 
page 23 of its brief that the $50.00 per day penalty clause 
in the inserted typewritten provision did not· purport 
to impose such penalty upon the subcontractor; that the 
appropriate place to accomplish this would be in the 
second paragraph of the second section of the subcontract 
form which was left blank. We submit that this is not 
the case. If it had not been the intention to charge the 
defendants with a $50.00 per day penalty, there· would 
have been no reason whatsoever in inserting the penalty 
provision in the typewritten portion of the subcontract. 
The typewritten provision specifically provided that time 
was of the essence of the contract; that the defendants 
would complete their work not only within 120 day time 
limit, but, "as scheduled." The use of the $50.00 a day 
penalty In connection with such language could have· 
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only one Inea.ning, nainely, that the defendants would 
be subjeet to a $50.00 per day penalty if they did not 
co1nplete their contract "·ithin the time liinit and "as 
scheduled." The reason the blanks were not filled in on 
the second paragraph 'Yas because the 1natter had been 
fully covered in the typewritten p·rovision. Since the 
plaintiff had gone to the time and trouble to type the 
specific provisions relative to time limit and penalty 
into the printed form of contract, it certainly intended 
that the defendants '""ere to be subject thereto, and we 
submit that this is the only reasonable construction of 
the proposed subcontract. 
If, as plaintiff contends, the defendants' proposal 
incorporated the ti1ne limit and penalty p·rovison because 
the proposal stated that the work would be done pur-
suant to the Plans and Specifications, there would then 
be no necessity for the plaintiff to typ·e in on its pTinted 
form of subcontract this specific propos-al because the 
printed provision of the contract likewise required the 
defendants to perform and complete the work in accord-
anee with the Plans and Specifications. Certainly, at the 
time the subcontract agreement was written, it was defi-
nitely felt by the plaintiff that the generai wording "to 
complete in accordance with the Plans and Sp·e~cifica­
tions" was not sufficient to bind the defendants to any 
time limit or penalty pro¥ision, otherwis·e, therH would 
have been no necessity of plaintiff's typing in this pro-
VISion. 
III. 
The second paragraph of the second provision of 
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the proposed subcontract agreement provides that the 
defendants shall not he. held responsible for any delays 
or interruptions caused by the neglect, delay or default 
of the plaintiff or the owner or the archite-ct or any other 
subcontractor and then contains the following provision: 
"* * * and the subcontractor hereby waives 
any and all claims upon the contractor for dam-
ages for any act, omission or delay caused by 
the contractor, the owner, the architect, or any 
other subcontractor, and hereby undertakes the 
work subject to all conditions as they now exist 
o~ rr1~y arise." 
The full significance and import of this provision 
In the proposed subcontract agreement can only be 
realized when it is considered in connection with other 
provisions of the proposed subcontract agreement. 
The S'eventh paragraph of the subcontract agree-
ment reads a·s follows: 
"The sub-contractor shall hold and save 
harmless the contractor, the owner and the archi-
tect from any and all liability, including costs and 
expenses, in the perforn1ance of this sub-con-
tract." 
The tenth provision of the proposed subcontract, 
among other things provides : 
"Sub-contractor agrees to keep his own work 
protected from damage by the elements and from 
damage likely otherwise to be occasioned in the 
performance of construction work and to protect 
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all other parts of the work from damage likely 
to be ca·used by the S·nb-contractor1s work, a.nd 
should any such damage be so cau.sed, to imme-
diately repair the same. Any default of the Sub-
contractor in any stttch cleaning, protection, or 
repairs, 1nay be remedied by the Contractor, and 
the cost deducted fro·m the contract price." 
The t\velfth provision of the proposed subcontract 
agreement reads as follows: 
""Neither the final payment nor any provision 
in the contract documents shall relieve the Sub-
contractor of responsibility for faulty materials 
or workmanship; and, unless otherwis-e specified, 
he shall remedy any defects and pay for any dam-
age to other work resulting therefrom, which shall 
appear within one year from the date of com-· 
pletion." 
It can thus readily be s·een that under the. terms 
and provisions of the prop-osed subcontract agreement 
the defendants would not only have to guarantee their 
work for a period of one year, but, in addition, would 
have to repair any damage to the work of the general 
contractor or any other subcontractor resulting from 
any faulty performance of the work on the part of the 
defendants. However, should the reverse situation take. 
place and should the defendants sustain damage by 
reason of any defective workmanship on the part of 
the general contractor or another subcontractor, the 
defendants under the proposed subcontract could not 
claim any damages. They specifically waived the same, 
and would have to assume the full responsibility of any 
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such loss. No such provision can be found in the de-
fendants' 'bid proposal or in the Plans and Specifications 
the1nselves, or from the conversations between Riding 
and Child. TheS'e provisions, and particularly, the pro-
posed waiver by the defendants of any claim for dam-
ages for any act, omission or delay by the contractor, 
owner, architect, or any other subcontractor can no 
where be found in or reasonably read into the· defend-
ants' proposal or in any provision of the Specifications 
on which the proposal might have been made. The provi-
sions are new and distinct provisions cre·ating substan-
tially different rights and liabilities and depriving the 
defendants of rights which by the contract were express-
ly reserved to the plaintiff as contractor and to other 
subcontractors. These provisions materially altered the 
defendants' proposal and accordingly constituted a re-
jection thereof. 
We submit that any one of the above 3 mentioned 
changes constituted material alterations in the defend-
ants' bid proposal and that any one of such alterations 
is of such a nature to make the proposed subcontract 
agreement as a matter of law amount to a new proposal 
and a rejection of the defendants' original proposal. The 
original proposal having been rejected by the counter-
proposal, the same could not thereafter be revived un-
less the defendants chose to re-submit it which according 
to the evidence they did not. 
See Restatement of the Law of Contracts, S·ection 
60, page· 66: 
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.... A. reply to an offer, though purporting to 
accept it, "Thich adds qualifications or requires 
perforn1anee of conditions, is not an acceptance 
but is a counter-offer." 
See also .... \.1n. J ur. \T ol. 12, page 543, Section 53: 
·"In order to form a contract, the offer and 
acceptance Inust express assent to one· and the 
sa1ne thing. The acceptance of the offer must be 
substantially as made; there· must be· no variance 
bet,veen the acceptance and the offer. An offer 
imposes no obligations until accepted according to 
its terms, without qualification or departure. 
* * * The acceptance must be unequivocal and 
unconditional. If a condition is affixed to the 
acceptance by the party to whom the offer is made 
or any modification of, or change in, the offer is 
made or requested, there is a rejection of the of-
fer, which puts an end to the negotiations, unless 
the party who made the original offer renews it or 
assents to the modification suggested. The other 
party, having once rejected the offer 'by a condi-
tional acceptance, cannot afterwards revive it by 
tendering an unconditional acceptance of it." 
See also William E. Iselin v. United States, 70 Law 
Ed. page 872 at page 87 4: 
"It is well settled that a proposal to accept, 
or an acceptance upon terms varying from those 
offered is a rejection of the offer, and p·uts an en1d 
to the negotiation, unless the party who made the 
original offer renews it, or assents to the modifi-
cation suggested." 
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See also Polhamus v. Roberts, (New Mexico 1946), 
175 Pac. (2) 196. In that case the plaintiff sent the fol-
lowing wire : 
"Will give two year lease on premises you 
occupy at $175 monthly. I am also ill and contem-
plate sale of the building as soon as possible. If 
you want lease please advise." 
The defendant forwarded the following airmail 
reply: 
"Received your wire dated January 15, 1945, 
agreeing to lease me the Green Lantern for two 
years at $175 per month. I accept the lease propo-
sition but as I wrote you before I am assigning 
all of my lease rights to the parties to whom I 
sold the bar, a Mr. J. A. Terry and Mr. Rulon 
Moody, and they desire to have a written lease 
from you, and consequently I have had a lease 
drawn up between you and Terry and Moody 
leasing this property for a term of two years. 
"They have signed the lease in duplicate and 
when you sign the same it will be complete. You 
can keep one copy and mail the other copy bacl~ 
to me for the purchasers. 
"I am also enclosing check of Moody and 
Terry for $175 for the first month's rent begin-
ning January 20, 1945. 
''I am sure these parties I am selling to will 
keep all rental paid promptly each month and will 
take good care of the premises. 
·"If the lease is not satisfactory you can draw 
a new lease and send it down, but I think the lease 
is okey. 
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HTrusting I may hear fron1 you by return 
1nail returning the signed copy of thH lease, and 
\Yith best regards, I am, Etc." 
The court held that the reply though purporting 
to accept the ter1ns of the offer added the condition that 
the written lease be 1nade to a third person to whom the 
offeree \\~as assigning his lease rights; that this consti-
tuted a departure from the terms of the offer, and was 
not a mere request of a favor to be complied with or not 
at the offeror's option, hut was a condition of the ac-
ceptance and was, therefore, a counter-offer and gave 
rise to no contract, quoting from RestatHment of Law 
of Contracts, S.ection 60, as follows: 
"A reply to an offer, though purporting to 
accept it, which adds qualifications or requires 
performance of conditions, is not an aeceptance 
but is a counter-offer." 
In Northea.stern Construction Company v. Winston-
Salem, Fourth Circuit, 83 Fed. (2) 57, the city after call-
ing for bid proposals for sewer work eliminated about 
15% of the work that had originally been projected. 
This was held to justify the successful bidder in with-
drawing his bid and refusing to undertake the work since 
obviou~ly the minds of the parties never met. It was 
further held that a stipulation in the specifications that 
a certain official was to ha~e the right to eliminate any 
part of the work did not authorize such an elimination 
before a contract was entered into as against a bidder 
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dicate what or whose figure the plaintiff had used in 
co1nputing the brick "\Vork portion of the job. Assuming 
that the plaintiff had used the defendants' figure, there 
was nothing to prevent the plaintiff, even after the bids 
had been opened and the Government had awarded its 
contract, from soliciting bids from other subcontractors 
for the brick work and giving the work to them. There 
is nothing in the record to show that the plaintiff in fact 
relied upon the defendants' bid because it could have 
done the work itself or had it performed by some other 
subcontractor. Since the plaintiff did not desire to bind 
itself to give a contract to the defendants in the event 
that the plaintiff was awarded the Government job, it 
cannot claim the 'bene.fi t of any promissory estoppel. 
Appellant relies upon the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel as set forth in the Restatement of the Law of 
Cnn tracts in Chapter 3, Section 90, and claims that the 
case of Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 10 
N.W. (2d) 879 is authority for the application of the 
doctrine in the case at bar. However, an examination 
of the facts in the Northwestern Engineering case will 
readily disclose that it has no similarity to the facts at 
issue in this case. In the Northwestern Engineering 
Company case the plaintiff and the defendant had en-
tered into a written agreement which, among other 
things, recited that the plaintiff proposed to submit a 
bid for the construction of a certain project; that the 
defendant desired to subcontract a portion of the work 
in the event that the plaintiff submitted the lowest bid 
and was awarded the contract. It was further agreed 
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in 'vri ting that if the plain tiff " .. as a " .. arded the con trart, 
that the defendant \vould perforn1 a portion of the work 
as a subcontractor on the terms stated in the written 
agreen1ent, and the plaintiff agreed to 1nake payment 
to the defendant in such event. This agreement was 
signed by both parties. The defendant in fact submitted 
a bidder's bond guaranteeing its p·erformance. In that 
case, therefore, the plaintiff by writing obligated the de-
fendant and itself to a subcontract in the event the. plain-
tiff \\ ... as a\\rarded the general contract. The. plaintiff in 
this case could have followed that procedure and p-ro-
tected itself but chose not to do so, and obviously did not 
desire to obligate itself in any way to the defendants. 
The Northwestern Engineering case is, therefore, not in 
point. 
The doctrine of pron1issory estopp·el is one of limit-
ed application. It most generally is used in connection 
with charitable subscriptions but has been extended to 
a promise not to plead the statute of limitations or other 
similar defense or to enforce marriage settlements based 
upon a promise, but it is only in these types of cases that 
the doctrine applies. See Williston on· Contracts, Sec. 
139 commencing at page 494 : 
"In the United States, the decisions which 
have enforced pro1nises, confessedly because of 
the promissee's action in reliance thereon have 
generally been cases of. charitable subscriptions 
where courts, dissatisfied with the prevailing 
theories by which consideration is found for such 
agreements, hut nevertheless dis.pose.d to follow 
the weight of American authority in sustaining 
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the subscriber's promise, have explained the lia-
bility on the ground of estoppel." 
And again in that section : 
"l)rornises of future action, it is generally 
held, if they can furnish the basis for an estoppel 
at all, can do so only where they relate to an in-
tended abandonment of an existing right, and are 
made to influence others who in fact are induced 
thereby to act or forebear. * * * 
"The law is clear that in any ca.se where a 
party to a contract agrees to give up a possible 
further defense or foregoes the· advantage of a 
condition provided for his benefit in an existing 
contract, the promise is binding if the promisee 
relying thereon changes his position. In these 
cases no new right is created. The court does 
not maintain an action on the promise; it reaches 
the desired result by allowing a defense to an 
action or allowing an original right to be en-
forced by merely prohibiting the interposition 
of a defense." 
See also Williston on Contracts, Sec. 692 and 693, 
commencing at page 1997, where it is clear that the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel is limited to cases which 
recreate a liability which by its terms had been ex-
tinguished or to an obligation which by its te:rms has 
already been extinguished or made impossible of per-
formance. 
Williston on Contracts, Sec. 140 states that the rule 
as announced in the Restatement of the Law, Sec. 90 does 
not go beyond the e·xisting law as enumerated in the 
aforementioned sections. 
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.. :\ .. ease \Yhich in our opinion clearly shows that the 
doctrine of pro1nissory estoppel does not apply is that of 
James Baird Co. v. Gin1bel Bros., Inc., Second Circuit, 
6-± Fed. (~) 3-1--±, decided by Judge Learned Hand. In 
that case the plaintiff had n1ade a general contract for 
the construction of a public building. The defendant had 
subnritted a bid to the plaintiff for the supplying of lino-
leunl used in the building but through an error had un-
derestimated the total yardage by about one-half of the 
proper amount. When it discovered its error, the de-
fendant "··ithdrew its offer, but the withdrawal was not 
received until after the plaintiff had put in its bid on a 
lump sum basis using the linoleum prices quoted by the 
defendant. The plaintiff's bid as general contractor was 
a"~arded and the defendant refused to recognize the 
existence of a subcontract to furnish the linoleum. The 
plaintiff sued the defendant. Judge Hand in that case 
held that there was no contract and that the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel did not apply. He said that the 
plaintiff had a ready escape from its difficulty by insist-
ing upon a contract fron1 the defendant before it used 
the defendant's figures. This would be similar to the con-
tract used in the Northwestern Engineering case. In 
commenting upon Sec. 90 of the Restatement of the La.'v 
of Contracts relative~ to the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel the court held that the doctrine did not apply 
under the facts of the instant case, saying: 
'~In the case at bar the defendant offered to 
deliver the linoleum in exchange for the p~laintiff's 
acceptance, not for its bid, which was a matter 
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of indifference to it. That offer could become 
a promise to deliver only when the equivalent was 
received ; that is, when the plain tiff promised to 
take and pay for it. There is no room in such a 
situation for the doctrine of 'promissory estop-
pel.'" 
The facts in the case at bar are analogous to those 
in the Ja,mes Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc. case. Ob-
viously, when the defendants submitted their bid they 
were interested in obtaining a contract. They were not 
interested in submitting a figure to the plaintiff which 
the plaintiff might use in its lump sum bid, and subse-
quently perform the work itself or award the work to 
some other subcontractor. The plaintiff, on the other 
hand, when it took the bid was not interested in binding 
itself to award a subcontract to the defendants in the 
event that the plain tiff was a warded the job. It, there-
fore, is in no position to now claim that the defendants 
are estopped to deny the existence of a contract. 
POINT V. 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL IS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE COURT'S GRANTING OF THE MOTION TO DIS-
MISS. NO JURY ISSUES WERE PRESENT. 
Both parties had entered into a stipulation and sub-
mitted the same, together with other evidence to the 
Court to enable the Court as a matter of law to deter-
mine whether there was a contract between the parties. 
At the pretrial counsel for the appellant conceded that 
all of the conversations bearing on the point had been 
reduced to deposition form and he knew of nothing then 
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that \vould change such testitnony. (R. 50-51) Without 
repeating our preYious argu1nents, \ve subrnit that the 
evidence clearly indicated that there was no contract 
as a 1natter of la,v. 
The apellant cornplains that there 'vere- disputed 
facts frorn \vhich a jury could have found that the de-
fendants' offer had been accepted by the· p[aintiff. We 
submit that such is not the case. The-re was no material 
disagreement in the essential facts as testified to by 
Child and Riding in their depositions. Both agre,ed that 
all of their conversations prior to the mailing of the 
printe-d form of contract by the plaintiff to the defend-
ants were of a preliminary nature. Riding positively 
testified to this effect and admitted that there had been 
no acceptance of the defendants' p-roposal in any of those 
conversations. There was, accordingly, no disputed issue 
to be submitted to the jury . 
..._-\_ppellant again cites the· case of Thornton v. Pasch, 
104 Utah 313, 139 Pac. (2d) 1002, which we have dis-
cussed elsewhere (supra, p. 24) in our brief and have 
shown ,was not in point under the facts in this case. 
Appellant further contends that there was a dis-
agreement between Riding and Child as to the date on 
which the conversation relative to the placing of reinforc-
ing steel took place and that if Riding's testimony were 
believed an inference of acceptance might be drawn. 
This is not the case because regardless of the date Rid-
ing admitted that at the time of such conve-rsation there 
had been no acceptance and that it was still just p·relimi-
nary negotiations. 
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Counsel also persists in stating that there was a dif-
ference between Riding and Child as to whether the de-
fendants had ordered brick for the job and that this 
should be a jury question. This has been fully covered 
in our brief, (supra, p. 23). There was no substantial dif-
ference betvveen Riding and Child in this regard. Child 
testified that he did not order any brick and Riding 
testified that he was not certain whether Child had used 
the word 'order' or not. 
By the clear and unmistakable statements and ad-
missions of Riding there had been no acceptance of the 
defendants' proposal prior to the time that the written 
contract was mailed to the defendants from the plaintiff's 
California office, and, as we have seen in our discussion 
under Point IV the mailing of the subcontract form itself 
was a counter-proposal and a rejection of the defend-
ants' original proposal. The lower court, therefore, 
properly held as a matter of law that there was no con-
tract between the parties. 
POINT VI. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
FORMAL WRITTEN MOTION WITH NOTICE THEREOF 
WERE NOT REQUIRED AND IN ANY EVENT WERE 
WAIVED BY THE PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT. 
Appellant's counsel complains that no formal motion 
to dismiss under Rule 12 (c) was made and that no no-
tice of such motion was served upon the plaintiff. This 
is a unique objection in view of the fact that both parties 
were in attendance at the pre-trial conference which "Tas 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
59 
for the very purpose of sub1nitting sufficient facts or 
data to ena:ble the Court to rule on the question as a mat-
ter of la,v. In fact, the parties had gone to the time 
and trouble to prepare a written stipulation to aid the 
Court in this regard . .At the conclusion of the pre-trial 
conference the Court asked the p-arties if they desired 
to make a motion and both so indicated and dictated their 
respective motions into the record. The plaintiff knew 
'vhat the respective motions were and, as a matter of 
fact, prepared a written 1nemorandum commencing at 
R. 67 'vhich "\vas entitled, "Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Hold the Case for Trial 
for Assessment of Damages." In other words, both par-
ties at the pre-trial hearing made motions. Neither made 
any objection to the manner in which the motions were 
made. Both prepared written memorandums which were 
submitted to the court at the time of the argument on the 
motions which was several days after the motions had 
been made and which date was agreed upon by the at-
torneys for the p·arties. If any notice or formal written 
motion were required, the same had been waived. 
Appellant also complains that Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were not prepared and signed 
by the Court. Rule 12 (b) provides for a motion to dis-
miss and ·states that if "matters outside· the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded 'by the. court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and dis-
posed of as provided in Rule 56." Rule 52 specifically 
provides, "Findings of F·act and Conclusions of Law 
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are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 
or 56 * * * ." We submit that the defendants' motion 
was a motion to dismiss where matters outside the plead-
ing were presented to the court in support thereof, and 
under such circumstances no Findings of F'act or Con-
clusions of Law were necessary. However, in any event 
the plaintiff herein waived Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law since it prepared the written order up-
on 'vhich it has based its appeal and appellant did not see 
the necessity of submitting any Findings of Fact or Con-
clusions of Law in support of said order. 
The plaintiff certainly understood from the motions 
and its conduct at the pre-trial hearing that the purpose 
of the motions was to permit the court to rule as a matter 
of law whether there was a contract between the parties. 
In fact, the plaintiff by its motion claimed that there 
was no material issue of fact and moved that the court 
find the existence of a contract and order the case for 
trial with the only question being the amount of the dam-
ages to be awarded. Neither party desired to go to the 
expense of a lengthy trial in which testimony as to ac-
counting and damages would be involved when both felt 
that the case could be decided as a matter of law on the 
basis of the stipulated facts and evidence subinitted to 
the court at the time of the pre-trial hearing. Both par-
ties desired the court to rule on the question of the exist-
ence of a contract as a matter of law. We submit that 
both parties agreed to the· procedure followed and that 
such procedure particularly under the circumstances was 
a proper application of the motion to dismiss and motion 
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for sun1n1ary judgment. There was no genuinH dispute 
between the parties on the n1aterial issues, and the record 
clearly indicated that there was no contract between the 
parties as a matter of la\v. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affir1ned. 
BENJAMIN L. RICH 
GORDON R. S·TRONG 
RICH & STRONG 
604-610 Boston ·Building 
Salt Lake City, U'tah 
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